Wittgenstein on 'Reddish-Green'
Remarks on Color
9. Even if green is not an intermediary colour between yellow and blue, couldn't there be people for whom there is bluish-yellow, reddish-green? I.e. people whose colour concepts deviate from ours—because, after all; the colour concepts of colour-blind people too deviate from those of normal people, and not every deviation from the norm must be a blindness, a defect.
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, II
422. If I had taught someone to use the names of the six primary colours, and the suffix "ish" then I could give him orders such as "Paint a greenish white here!"—But now I say to him "Paint a reddish green!" I observe his reaction. Maybe he will mix green and red and not be satisfied with the result; finally he may say "There's no such thing as a reddish green."—Analogously I could have gotten him to tell me: "There's no such thing as a regular biangle!", or "There's no such thing as the square root of -25."
428. It is obvious at a glance that we aren't willing to acknowledge anything as a colour intermediate between red and green. (Nor does it matter whether this is always obvious to people, or whether it took experience and education to make it so.) What would we think of people who were acquainted with 'reddish-green' (e.g., who called olive-green by that name)? And what does this mean: "Then they have a different concept of colour altogether"? As if they wanted to say: "Well, then it wouldn't be this but a different concept of colour"—all the while pointing to our own. As if there were an object to which the concept belonged unequivocally.
429. These people are acquainted with reddish green. "But there is no such thing!"--What an extraordinary sentence.—(How do you know?)
Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, I
"Nothing is as common as the colour reddish-green; for nothing is more common than the transition of leaves from green to red." (p. 59)
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, II
422. If I had taught someone to use the names of the six primary colours, and the suffix "ish" then I could give him orders such as "Paint a greenish white here!"—But now I say to him "Paint a reddish green!" I observe his reaction. Maybe he will mix green and red and not be satisfied with the result; finally he may say "There's no such thing as a reddish green."—Analogously I could have gotten him to tell me: "There's no such thing as a regular biangle!", or "There's no such thing as the square root of -25."
428. It is obvious at a glance that we aren't willing to acknowledge anything as a colour intermediate between red and green. (Nor does it matter whether this is always obvious to people, or whether it took experience and education to make it so.) What would we think of people who were acquainted with 'reddish-green' (e.g., who called olive-green by that name)? And what does this mean: "Then they have a different concept of colour altogether"? As if they wanted to say: "Well, then it wouldn't be this but a different concept of colour"—all the while pointing to our own. As if there were an object to which the concept belonged unequivocally.
429. These people are acquainted with reddish green. "But there is no such thing!"--What an extraordinary sentence.—(How do you know?)
Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, I
"Nothing is as common as the colour reddish-green; for nothing is more common than the transition of leaves from green to red." (p. 59)
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